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Summary. We consider a general agency model with coexisting hidden ac-
tion and hidden information. We prove that, with minor technical qualiﬁca-
tions, independence of the production technology from the consumer type is
necessary and suﬃcient for welfare irrelevance of hidden action. Our result
clariﬁes and conﬁrms the main conclusion drawn in the existing literature
on mixed models, that if the parties are risk neutral and the production
technology is not correlated with private information, then hidden action is
irrelevant. However it makes it clear that even under risk neutrality this con-
clusion does not extend to the correlated case, which in practice occurs quite
frequently. We illustrate it with a realistic example where neither hidden
action nor hidden information on their own lead to welfare losses, while their
combination does.
Keywords and Phrases: hidden action, hidden information, Fredholm
integral equations of the ﬁrst type.
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21 Introduction
Agency relationships form an important part of economic life. Among the
most common examples are managers acting on behalf of an owner, workers
supplying labor to a ﬁrm, and customers buying coverage from an insurance
company. The common feature of all these examples is that unobservable ac-
tions undertaken by one party have payoﬀ relevant consequences for another.
This creates a moral hazard problem.T h em a i nt r a d e - o ﬀ the contracting par-
ties face in moral hazard situations is a trade-oﬀ between risk and incentives.1
Hence, if both parties are risk neutral moral hazard will not create welfare
losses.
Often a moral hazard situation is complicated by the existence of hidden
information. For example, managers or workers may have diﬀerent costs of
eﬀort, or customers buying a medical insurance may have diﬀerent health
conditions. Below, for concreteness, we will call the unobservable action
eﬀort and the hidden information the type of the agent. This type of models
were pioneered by Laﬀont and Tirole (1986) and later developed by Picard
(1987), Rogerson (1988), Guesnerie, Picard, and Rey (1989), Melumad and
Reichelstein (1989), and Caillaud, Guesnerie, and Ray (1992). The common
1For a review of standard principal-agent problem, see Grossman and Hart (1983).
3assumption in these papers is that the noise in the production technology
is independent of the agent’s type, that is, the models are just noisy hidden
information models. The main result of this literature is that, if both parties
are risk neutral, then in most such models the principal can reach the same
utility as in the absence of noise.
To understand this result let us as a ﬁrst stage assume that the eﬀort is
contractible and solve the adverse selection problem. The result will be a
wage schedule conditional on the eﬀort level. To implement the same eﬀort
at the same cost when the eﬀort is not contractible, the principal has to ﬁnd
a wage schedule, which depends only on the observable signal, such that the
expectation of this schedule conditional on eﬀo r tg i v e st h es c h e d u l ef o u n d
at stage one. This problem can be reduced to solving a Fredholm integral
equation of the ﬁrst type. If the density of the noise is suﬃciently well
behaved (does not have interior singularities) this equation always possesses
a solution.
One can, however, easily come up with examples of economically inter-
esting situations, where the production technology is type dependent. For
instance, assume that diﬀerent research institutions compete for the govern-
ment’s grants. Each institution has a research project which is characterized
4by the potential success probability θ. The actual success probability de-
pends on both θ, which can be interpreted as the quality of the project, and
the eﬀort level. In that case the expected payoﬀ to the project for a given
eﬀort will still depend on the private information of the institutions, and it is
not clear whether the principal can reach the same utility as in the absence
of noise.
In this paper we start by formulating a general model with hidden action
and hidden information. We provide the ﬁrst order characterization of the
solution and use it to prove that the principal can achieve the same utility
under the hidden action as in the case of the observable eﬀort if and only if
the production technology is independent on the agent’s type and some mild
regularity conditions on the noise density are satisﬁed. When the latter is the
case we ﬁnd explicit solutions in the cases when the optimal compensation
schedule in the pure hidden action model is analytical and the production
noise is either additive and is normally distributed or multiplicative and is
exponentially distributed.
The paper is organized in the following way. In Section 2 we introduce
the main model and derive the ﬁrst order characterization of the solution. In
Section 3 we derive the necessary and suﬃcient conditions for the irrelevance
5of moral hazard and solve some examples. These examples allow the reader
to get the better understanding how to apply the theorems of the paper and
also provide useful explicit solutions. In Section 4 we solve an example for
which both hidden action and hidden information are relevant in determining
the welfare of the parties. The striking feature of that example is that in
the situation it describes neither hidden action nor hidden information on
their own entail any welfare losses, while their combination does. Section 5
concludes.
2T h e m o d e l
Consider a risk neutral principal and risk neutral agent who are engaged
in a following type of a transaction. An agent undertakes an eﬀort z that
generates the distribution of proﬁts f(x;z,θ) for the principal and entails
cost c(z,θ) for an agent. Variable θ is privately observed by the agent and
can be interpreted as her type. Neither the type of the agent nor the eﬀort
are observed by the principal. The proﬁts, on the other hand are observable
and veriﬁable. Upon the proﬁt realization, x, the agent receives wage w(x)
according to the in-advance-agreed-upon wage schedule, w(·).
6The probability density f(·;z,θ) is assumed to be continuously diﬀeren-
tiable and strictly positive on its support, while the cost, c(·;θ) is assumed
to be increasing and convex. Moreover, c(·,·) is twice diﬀerentiable and
satisﬁes the Spence-Mirrlees condition, i. e. czθ < 0.W h i l eθ is private in-
formation, we assume that the principal believes it comes from a distribution
with a continuously diﬀerentiable and strictly positive on its support density
g(·). The support of the distribution is assumed to be a segment [θ,θ],w h e r e





be the expected payoﬀ for the principal if the agent of type θ chooses eﬀort
level z. Finally, let us assume that the function V (z,θ) deﬁned by




is strictly concave in z and supermodular in (z,θ).
72.1 The case of the observable eﬀort
In this subsection we will concentrate on the case of observable eﬀort,
i. e. the principal faces a pure hidden information problem. In that case
the analysis is standard and the assumptions guarantee that the solutions to
the relaxed and complete problems coincide. Let z(θ) be the optimal eﬀort
schedule in the case when the eﬀort is observable. It solves
z(θ)=a r gm a xV (z,θ). (3)
For a discussion, see Mussa and Rosen (1978). Deﬁne the consumer surplus,











8Intuitively, assume that the principal has to compensate the agent for the
cost of eﬀort and leave her information rents ξ(θ). If she wants to induce
level of eﬀort z, she selects the type for which the total cost of inducing this
eﬀort is minimal.
2.2 The case of the unobservable eﬀort
Let us return to our model with unobservable eﬀort. The principal’s












w(x))f(x;z,θ)dx − c(z,θ)) ≥ 0
. (6)




w(x)f(x;z,θ)dx − c(z,θ)). (7)













The Hamiltonian for the problem (8) is:
H =( π(z,θ) − c(z,θ) − s(θ))g(θ)+λ(θ)(
Z
w(x)fθ(x;z,θ)dx − cθ(z,θ)) + (9)
µ(θ)(s(θ) −
Z
w(x)f(x;z,θ)dx − c(z,θ)). (10)
Our next objective is to prove that µ(θ)=0a.e. with respect to the Lebesgue





converges uniformly in θ. Let (z(θ),s(θ),w(x)) solve the optimal control
problem (8) and let λ(θ) and µ(θ) be the Lagrange multipliers for the ﬁrst
and second constraint respectively. Then µ(θ) ≤ 0 a. e. with respect to the
10Lebesgue measure.













If (z(θ),s(θ),w(x)) solve this optimal control problem and let λ(θ) and µ(θ)
be the Lagrange multipliers, than the Kuhn-Tucker necessary conditions in-
sure that µ(θ) ≤ 0 a. e. with respect to the Lebesgue measure. To complete
the proof we have to argue that the second constraint binds. Indeed, assum-
ing the constraint is slack one can increase w(x) by suﬃciently small ε for
all proﬁt realizations. Then this constraint will still hold. But such a change








converges uniformly assures that the last integral is zero.
Q. E. D.
Lemma 2 Under assumptions of Lemma 1 µ(θ)=0a. e. with respect to
the Lebesgue measure.
Proof. Assume that (z(θ),s(θ); λ(θ),µ(θ)) are deﬁn e da si nL e m m a1 .T h e n






w(x)fθ(x;z,θ) − c(z,θ) ≥ 0
. (15)






w(x)fθ(x;z,θ) − c(z,θ) ≥ 0.
(16)
If µ(θ) < 0 on a set of positive measure one can always increase w(x),w h i c h
will increase the value of the objective function on a set of positive measure.
12Q. E. D.
These two lemmata allow us to exclude the last term from the Hamil-




λθ = g(θ),λ (θ)=0 .
(πz(z,θ) − cz(z,θ))g(θ)+λ(θ)(
Z
w(x)fθz(x;z,θ)dx − cθz(z,θ)) = 0
.
(17)
This equations together with the constraints of problem (8) determine the
solution. One can eliminate surplus from these constraints and solve the ﬁrst
of the ﬁrst order conditions for λ to obtain the following system of equations












Note that the second of these equations is simply the ﬁrst order condition
with respect to the eﬀort for the agent who faces the wage schedule w(·).
133 When the hidden information is irrelevant?
In this Section we are going to address the question: Under which con-
ditions will the solution to the problem with hidden eﬀo r ti m p l i e st h es a m e
eﬀort and same expected surplus for all types as in the case when the eﬀort
is observable? To begin let us prove the following lemma.
Lemma 3 Let the eﬀort level and the expected surplus be the same for all
t y p e sa si nt h ec a s eo ft h eo b s e r v a b l ee ﬀort. Then the expected payment of
the principal conditional on eﬀort, z, is v(z), i. e. it is the same as in the
case of the observable eﬀort.
Proof. Let z(·), and s(·) be deﬁned by (3)-(4). From the deﬁnition of the




According to equation (4) the left hand side of (19) does not depend on θ.
Moreover, according to (5) it equals v(z). To complete the proof note that
the right had side of (19) is the expected payment of the principal conditional
on eﬀort.
Q. E. D.
14Using Lemma 3 we will prove the following result.
Lemma 4 The principal will choose to implement the same eﬀort levels for
all types and make the same expected payment conditional on eﬀort as in the
case of the observable type if and only if there exists function w : R+ → R+
such that for any θ ∈ [θ,θ]
Z
w(x)f(x;z,θ)dx = v(z). (20)
Proof. The necessity follows from Lemma 3. To prove suﬃciency note that
equation (20) implies that
Z
w(x)fθ(x;z,θ)dx =0 . (21)
Z
w(x)fθz(x;z,θ)dx =0 . (22)
Therefore, λ(θ)=G(θ) − 1 and z = z(θ), where z(θ) is deﬁned by (3) solve
system (17). Moreover, the Hamiltonian becomes
H = g(θ)V (z,θ). (23)
Under our assumptions on function V (·,·) the eﬀort schedule z(θ) is imple-
15mentable and maximizes the Hamiltonian. Therefore, it is optimal.
Q. E. D.
Lemma 4 reduces the task of analyzing the conditions for the irrelevance
of the hidden action to task of studying the conditions of the existence of a
solution of equation (20).





f(x;z,θ)g(θ)dθ)dx = v(z). (24)
Proof. A straightforward calculation changing the order of integration
proves our assertion.
Q. E. D.
Note that the right hand side of equation (20) does not depend on θ.T h i s
suggests that for a solution to exist it is necessary that the output density
be independent on θ as well.
T of o r m u l a t ei tp r e c i s e l yl e tu se v e r yf u n c t i o nh(x,z) such that h(x,·),











We will refer to this function below as symmetrized kernels. We will say that






if and only if φ(z)=0almost everywhere. Now we are ready to formulate
our next result.
Theorem 1 Assume that v(·) is diﬀerent from zero at a set of a positive
measure, there exists θ ∈ Ω such that the kernel k
fθ
1 (x,z;θ) is closed and for
any w(·) which satisﬁes equation (24) the integral
Z
fθ(x,z,θ)w(x)dx (27)
converges uniformly in θ. Then equation (20) has no solutions.
Note that assumption that K(x,z) is closed in particular implies that
17fθ(x,z,θ) should diﬀer from zero on a set of a positive measure.
Proof. Let equation (20) possess a solution. Denote it by w(x).N o t et h a t
w(·) cannot be identically zero almost everywhere. According to Lemma
5, function w(·) satisﬁes equation (24). Diﬀerentiating equation (20) with
respect to θ one obtains
Z
fθ(x,z,θ)w(x)dx =0 . (28)
The diﬀerentiation under the sign of integral is legitimate because of our
assumption of the uniform convergence. If equation (28) has a non-trivial
solution, kernel k
fθ
1 (x,z;θ) should be not closed for all θ (see, Pogorzelski,
1966), which proves the Theorem.
Q. E. D.
4 Type-independent technologies: a closer look
In the previous section we showed that independence of technology on
the private information of agents is the basic economic assumption, which
is necessary for hidden action to be irrelevant. Let us under when it is also
18suﬃcient. In order words, what are the conditions for the equation:
Z
w(x)f(x,z)dx = v(z). (29)
to possess a solution.
T h ec l a s s i c a lt h e o r e mi nt h i sa r e ai st he Picard’s Theorem (see, Pogorzel-
ski, 1966). It was ﬁrst applied to a problem in mechanism design by Melumad
and Reichelstein (1989). One, however, need to adapt it slightly for this
case. Indeed, to apply the Theorem the r i g h th a n ds i d es h o u l db eas q u a r e -
integrable function. In our application, however, the right hand side is the
eﬀort-wage schedule, which should be increasing. Therefore, it could not be
square integrable unless the eﬀort has compact support. Fortunately, this
problem can be easily circumvented if one multiplies both sides of equation
(29) on a such function g(·) that it has full support and the right hand side
becomes square intergrable For example, if v(·) is diﬀerentiable and not equal







The following theorem provides the necessary and suﬃcient conditions
19for the existence of the solution of equation (29).
Theorem 2 Let function g(·):R+ → R+ with a full support be such
that:function vg(·) ∈ L2(R+). Equation (29) has a solution if and only if:












converges, where λn are eigenvalues of T, i. e. they satisfy
Tψn = λnψn (33)





Moreover, if kernel kfg(x,z) is closed the solution is unique.
20Proof. The theorem is a direct consequence of the Picard’s theorem applied
to the equation:
Z
w(x)g(z)f(x,z)dx = v(z)g(z). (35)
Q. E. D.
An easy corollary of this theorem is the following.
Corollary 1 If operator T deﬁned by equation (31) is compact then there
exists a solution of equation (29).
Proof. The spectrum of a compact operator is discrete and bounded, i. e.
there exists K>0 such that all eigenvalues satisfy













2 < ∞.( 3 7 )
The equality here is the Parceval’s equality ((see, Pogorzelski, 1966).
Q. E. D.
After developing the general theory let us consider a few examples.
21Example 1 Let us assume that the production technology is multiplicative,
i. e.
x = zε. (38)








)dx = v(z). (39)
Let us ﬁrst prove that if v(·) grows no faster than a polynomial equation
(39) possesses a solution. Indeed, assume this is the case. Then function





exp(−x − z). (40)
To prove that operator T deﬁned by (31) is compact we have to prove that
for any family of functions H such that
khkH1(R+) ≤ K for ∀h ∈ H (41)
22t h ef a m i l yo ff u n c t i o n s
{Th}h∈H (42)
is uniformly bounded and equicontinuos. Uniform boundness follows from the
following sequence of inequalities:
kThkH1(R+) =




x+z exp(−x − z)h(z)dz)2dx +




x+z exp(−x − z)h(z)dz)2dx ≤








x+z)2 exp(−2(x + z)dzdx +




x+z exp(−2(x + z)dzdx) < 4K,
(43)
where the last estimate comes from




x+z)2 exp(−2(x + z)dzdx +




x+z exp(−2(x + z)dzdx ≤









x2 exp(−2x)dx < 4.
(44)
To prove equicontinuity it is suﬃcient to prove that the derivatives of all





x+z exp(−x − z)h(z)dz ≤








x+z)2 exp(−2(x + z))dz ≤
2K
v u u t
Z
R+
z6 exp(−2z)dz < 6K.
(45)
The existence of the solution follows know from the Corollary 1. Let us
actually ﬁnd a solution to equation (39) in the case
v(z)=z
a,a > 0.( 4 6 )
L e tu sl o o kf o ras o l u t i o ni naf o r m
w(x)=cx
a, (47)

































.( 5 2 )
Note that for a convex function v(·) (which is usually the case in screening
models), w(·) is ﬂatter than v(·). The unobservability of eﬀort leads to lower
powered incentives despite the fact that the agents are risk neutral. Assume
that function v(·) is analytical at zero, i. e. in some neighborhood of z =0















Note that the radius of convergence of series (54) is at least as big as that of
series (53).
The choice of function g(·) in our example is rather instructive. The term
z2 was selected to kill the singularity at zero, while the exponent guaranteed
that the symmetrized kernel will behave well at inﬁnity. The key property
that allowed as to do it was that function f(·,·) did not have interior singu-
larities. More precisely, the following result holds.
Theorem 3 Let function g(·):R+ → R+ with a full support be such














is a Hilbert-Schmidt operator and therefore, is compact.
Proof. An operator is a Hilbert-Schmidt operator if and only if its kernel is
square intergrable (see, Pugachev and Sinitsyn, 1999). Therefore, one has to







2dxdy < ∞. (57)











2(x)dx < ∞. (59)
















The major example of densities for which conditions of Theorem 3 will
be violated are the densities which have a singularity along line z = x, i. e.
f(x,z)=O(|x − z|
α) (63)
for some α<1. Note, however, that conditions of Theorem 3 are suﬃcient
but not necessary for the existence of the solution. Let us demonstrate this
















b.( 6 5 )
Though the conditions of Theorem 3 are not satisﬁed the solution of equation















can still be found. Indeed, let us look for the solution in a form
w(x)=cx
b. (67)
Substituting it into equation (66) and making a change of variables


















29Evaluating the integrals one obtains:








n!(2n +1 ) Γ(b +1− n)
). (71)






Otherwise, it should be understood as the analytical continuation of function
(72).
Note that the sum on the right hand side converges. Moreover, if b ∈ N
it has only ﬁnitely many non-zero terms, since 1/Γ(w)=0 , for non-positive
integer values of w.
Having solved examples with multiplicative technological uncertainty and
uncertainty with a singular density, let us ﬁnally solve an example with ad-
ditive technological uncertainty.
Example 3 Let us assume that the production technology is additive, i. e.
x = z + ε. (73)
30Let us also assume that ε is distributed normally with mean zero and variance







2)dx = v(z). (74)
Proof of the existence is similar to Example 1 and is omitted. Let us ﬁnd the
s o l u t i o ni nt h ec a s ew h e nv(z)=zn,w h e r en ∈ N.Let us look for a solution
in a form
w(x)=cHn(x), (75)






(see, Pugachev and Sinitsyn, 1999). Substituting (75) into (74) one obtains:
cIn(z)=z
n, (77)










Using deﬁnition (76) and integrating (78) by parts one can prove that In(z)
solves:





and c = 1
2n.Finally, if function v(·) is analytical at zero, i. e. in some













325 When does hidden action entails a welfare
loss?
In the previous section we established that independence of technology of
the private information of the agents is the basic economic assumption that
makes hidden action problem irrelevant from the welfare point of view. In
this section we are going to provide an economically natural example, when
this condition does not hold and ﬁnd the optimal contract. The example is
particularly interesting, because in the situation it describes neither hidden
action nor hidden information on their own lead to welfare losses, while their
combination does.
Assume diﬀerent research institutions compete for government grants for
research projects. Each institution has a research project which is charac-
terized by the potential success probability q ∈ [0,1]. The actual success
probability is qθ where θ ∈ [0,1] is the eﬀort level. The cost of a project is
normalized to be zero. The cost of eﬀort is given by an increasing, convex
and twice continuously diﬀerentiable function h(θ). If successful, the project
results into production of a public good. The value of it to the society is
one. Both the success probability and the cost of the project are private
33information to the research institution. There is a continuum of the research
institutions.
T h eg o v e r n m e n tk n o w st h ep o p u l a t i o nd e n s i t yf(q) of diﬀerent types of
projects, which is assumed to have a compact support and be strictly positive
at any point in the support. It aims to maximize the expected payoﬀst ot h e
projects net of the funding costs subject to the incentive and participation
constraints (we assume that the social cost of a $1 transfer exceeds $1 because
of the deadweight loss of taxation, for simplicity we normalize the cost of
raising this revenue to be $1). Denote the value of the outside option by U0.




(qθ(1 − y) − t(y))f(q,x)dq (83)
(y,θ) ∈ argmax(qθy − h(θ) − t(y)) (84)
max
(y,θ)
(qθy − h(θ) − t(y)) ≥ U0. (85)
For this purpose, the government oﬀers a menu of pairs (t,y) where t is an
up-front payment and y is a success prize. Incentive compatibility requires
that y1 = y2 implies t1 = t2. Therefore, without loss of generality we can
assume that the government oﬀers a schedule t(y).
34Note that the government observes the signal z ∈ {0,1},w h e r ez =1if
and only if the project is successful. Since the probability that z =1is qθ,
and depends on q for a given value of θ, the production technology depends
on the private information of the consumers.
Timing is the following. At time zero the government announces the
schedule t(y). An institution decides whether to participate and if so, which
contract to choose. That is it picks up y∗ and receives t(y∗). Then it chooses
research eﬀort θ. If the research is successful an institution gets the prize y∗.
The institution is assumed to be risk neutral.
We will solve the problem by backward induction. After y is chosen, the
institution selects θ to solve
max(qθy − h(θ)). (86)
The ﬁrst order condition is
h
0(θ)=qy. (87)
35Deﬁne the indirect utility of an institution by
v(qy)=qyθ(qy) − h(θ(qy)) (88)











00(z) ≥ 0 (90)
the single crossing property is satisﬁed and y(q) is implementable if and only
if it is increasing. For a proof, see Mussa and Rosen (1978).
Deﬁne the surplus of an institution by
u(q)=m a x
y (v(qy) − t(y)) (91)











[qθ − h(θ) − u(q)]f(q)dq (93)









(qθ − CSB(q,θ))f(q)dq, (95)






The cost function can easily be understood intuitively. The ﬁrst term repre-
sents the physical cost of eﬀort. In the absence of adverse selection it gives
the implementation cost. The second term captures an increase in the in-
formation rents earned by the types on interval [q,1] due to the increase in
37eﬀort.
Assume that 2h00(θ)+θh000(θ) ≥ 0 .T h e n CSB(q,·) is convex for any
distribution F(·). In this case the unique solution to (95) will be interior and
increasing in q, which implies that all types will participate. If the resulting
y(q) is increasing, there is full separation of types, otherwise one should
apply ironing procedure developed by Mussa and Rosen (1978). For q =1
the second best cost coincides with h(θ) which implies no distortions at the
top, in accordance with the general result in the screening literature.
For h(θ)=θ
2/2 and a uniform distribution of the success probability is














Since y(·) is increasing it is implementable.
It is easy to check that the ﬁrst best outcome is implementable under
38either adverse selection or moral hazard alone. Indeed, if q is observable
then an institution receives an up-front payment U0−v(q) and a prize one if
and only if it succeeds. If θ is observable then the government will oﬀer an
up-front payment t = h(θ) and no success prize.
T h em a i nf e a t u r eo ft h ea b o v ee x a m p l ei st h a tt h ee ﬀort improves the
type. Such situations are quite general, especially in the cases when a party
can make an unobservable relation-speciﬁc investment. Hence, we conclude
that the interaction moral hazard and adverse selection can generate a welfare
loss in an economically interesting environment even if the both parties are
risk-neutral.
6C o n c l u s i o n s
In this paper we consider a general model with coexisting hidden action
and hidden information. Starting from a model without any speciﬁc assump-
tions on the production technology we characterize the ﬁrst order properties
of the solution and prove that, with minor technical qualiﬁcations, indepen-
dence of the production technology from the consumer type is necessary and
suﬃc i e n tf o rt h ew e l f a r ei r r e l e v a n c eo fh i d d e na c t i o n . T h em o s ti m p o r t a n t
39case when this criterion might break is when the distribution of output has
interior singularities. We also solve some examples explicitly.
Our result clariﬁes and conﬁrms the main conclusion drawn in the existing
literature on mixed models, that if the parties are risk neutral and the produc-
tion technology is not correlated with private information, then hidden action
is irrelevant. However it makes it clear that even under risk neutrality this
conclusion does not extend to the correlated case, which in practice occurs
quite frequently. We illustrate this with an example motivated by research
contracting, where the project type aﬀects both the success probability and
the marginal eﬀect of eﬀort. The example is particularly striking because, in
the situation it describes, neither hidden action nor hidden information on
their own lead to welfare losses, while their combination does.
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